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FREEDOM STRUGGLES AND THE LIMITS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY
AZIZ RANA ∗
I. INTRODUCTION: CONSTITUTIONAL OR POLITICAL REDEMPTION?
In the dying days of Hosni Mubarak’s rule in Egypt, regime opponents, American officials, and academic commentators began debating how best to transition to a new political era. One argument
that gained momentum was the view that regime change would only
be legitimate if it remained faithful to principles of constitutionalism. 1
This meant that the removal of Mubarak should follow the procedural
mechanisms for succession established by Egypt’s existing 1971 Constitution. In the words of two outspoken and respected critics of Mubarak, Hossam Bahgat and Soha Abdelaty, “real transition to democracy” required fidelity to the Constitution as the privileged instrument
for change. 2 Thus, Mubarak should not resign from power until he
issued a series of decrees transferring authority, decrees that under
the 1971 Constitution only the president could sign. These decrees
would “delegat[e] all of his authorities to his vice president until their
current terms end[ed]” and lift the state of emergency that had been
in place since Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981. 3 For Bahgat and
Abdelaty, following the constitutionally sanctioned process was “not
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1. Hossam Bahgat & Soha Abdelaty, Op-Ed., What Mubarak Must Do Before He Resigns,
WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2011/02/04/AR2011020404123.html. Bahgat and Abdelaty were the executive
director and deputy director of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, a domestic human rights organization that had long been a thorn in the regime’s side.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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simply a legal technicality” but rather “the only way out of our nation’s political crisis.” 4
At the heart of this argument was a narrative about the 1971
Egyptian Constitution that emphasized its pluralistic and liberal dimensions. 5 According to this narrative, when Sadat succeeded Gamal
Abdel Nasser as president, he attempted to shift Egypt’s ideological
orientation away from Nasserite authoritarianism. As political scientist Nathan Brown writes, “Sadat convened a large and remarkably diverse committee: feminists, Islamic legal scholars, liberals, socialists,
nationalists, and representatives of the Christian church were all
represented.” 6 The result was a document that “contained guarantees
for individual freedoms, democratic procedures, and judicial independence.” 7 It promised to weaken the most entrenched institutions
of Nasser’s regime, particularly Egypt’s sole political party and its security apparatus. In the decades since—so the narrative goes—there
has been backsliding on the promises embedded in the Constitution,
the worst example being the 2007 textual amendments pressed
through by Mubarak. 8 These amendments undermined the independence of election monitoring, limited who could run for president, prohibited the Muslim Brotherhood from establishing a political party, and constitutionalized coercive emergency measures (such
as the presidential use of reliable military courts to convict regime
opponents). 9 Despite this backsliding, the Constitution nonetheless
embodies those basic liberal principles expressed during its genesis.
As one noted scholar of Egypt reminded anti-Mubarak activists, “out
of its 211 articles, only about a dozen are fundamentally illiberal and
each of these is easily identified. . . . [T]he pro-democracy movement
should not lose sight of the fact that the current constitution contains
most of the liberties and protections that they currently seek.” 10
4. Id.
5. Nathan J. Brown, Egypt’s Constitutional Ghosts: Deciding the Terms of Cairo’s Democratic
Transition, FOREIGN AFF. (Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
67453/nathan-j-brown/egypts-constitutional-ghosts?page=show.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Nathan J. Brown, Michele Dunne & Amr Hamzawy, Egypt’s Controversial Constitutional Amendments, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 1 (Mar. 23, 2007),
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/egypt_constitution_webcommentary01.pdf.
9. See generally Dina Bishara, Egyptian Constitutional Amendments Passed on March 19,
2007: Translated Excerpts, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE;
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/appendix.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2012).
10. Hussein Agrama et al., Anti-Authoritarian Revolution and Law Reform in Egypt: A Jadaliyya E-Roundtable, JADALIYYA (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/714/anti-authoritarian-revolution-and-law-reform-in-eg (quoting Tamir Moustafa).
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Indeed, for Bahgat and Abdelaty, textual rupture at the moment
of Mubarak’s resignation was not simply extra-legal. It disregarded
the liberating tools available within the established constitutional
framework for navigating the process of transition. 11 Rupture abandoned the rule-of-law benefits of constitutional continuity in favor of
pure popular (or even military) discretion, in which decision making
would occur independently of any previously agreed upon or specified process. 12 And above all, it ignored how political redemption in
Egypt (the fulfillment of those long deferred liberal ambitions) could
be facilitated through faith in a shared constitutional text.
But this narrative, emphasizing the redemptive possibilities of the
1971 Constitution, faced its own powerful counter-narrative. For
many engaged in mass protest against the regime, the existing Constitution did not embody a flickering liberal promise but rather a very
real infrastructure of authoritarianism and emergency. Since the
1980s, the Mubarak regime had passed a series of oppressive laws,
aimed at strangling internal dissent and expanding the coercive power of the security state. 13 Such legislation placed profound restrictions
on freedom of the press, the right of assembly, the independence of
non-governmental organizations, procedural due process, civilian
court jurisdiction, labor protections and collective bargaining, the organization of political parties, and the convening of elections. 14 In
the words of an outside observer, although these measures ultimately
derived from the 1981 state of emergency, “the permissive condition
for this legislation has been a constitution that does not protect
against . . . far-reaching assertions of police powers and which, since
2007, has constitutionalized the infrastructure for normalizing the
emergency decrees through new counterterrorism laws.” 15 In a sense,
regardless of the niceties contained in the document, the everyday
meaning of the constitutional system had been the increased centralization of presidential power, the dismantling of judicial independence, and the systematic infringement of basic rights. 16 Assuming

11. Bahgat & Abdelaty, supra note 1.
12. Id.
13. Charles Robert Davidson, Reform and Repression in Mubarak’s Egypt, 24 FLETCHER F.
OF WORLD AFF. 75, 89–91 (2000); Jeff Martini & Julie Taylor, Comamanding Democracy in
Egypt, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2011, at 127–28.
14. See Agrama, supra note 10 (including the comments of legal scholar Asli Bali on the
effects of Mubarak’s repressive regulations).
15. Id. (quoting Asli Bali).
16. As Nathan J. Brown remarked at the time of the 1971 constitution, “for every
commitment, there was also a trap door; for every liberty, there was a loophole that ulti-
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that faith in this system could be the basis for building a durable antiauthoritarian regime would be naïve at best. Rather than a dangerous
step into the darkness, the counter-narrative presented conscious
constitutional rupture as a necessary prerequisite for meaningful
change.
One should note that the disagreement between the liberal and
authoritarian narratives of the Constitution was not fundamentally a
disagreement about the ultimate objectives of transition. As described above, both sides were regime dissidents and both were committed to the creation in Egypt of what Jack Balkin might call “a democratic culture: a culture in which all citizens can participate and feel
they have a stake, a culture in which unjust social privileges and hierarchies have been disestablished.” 17 Such a culture “include[s] both
legal rights and institutions as well as cultural predicates for the exercise of those rights and institutions.” 18 Where they broke ranks decisively was over whether the country’s shared post-Nasser constitutional
project could serve as the mechanism for producing this outcome.
Opponents of constitutional continuity believed that regardless of the
liberal narrative of the 1971 document, the existing constitution-inpractice fundamentally constrained the normative and institutional
tools available for transformation. 19 For them constitutional faith
meant subordinating the end of a democratic culture to the faulty
discursive and structural means offered by the prevailing constitutional system. The true goal was political redemption, in which out of
the ashes of Mubarak’s regime would emerge a new transcendent and
liberated community. And such transcendence required abandoning
the hope of constitutional redemption—that is, fulfilling the deferred
promise of the 1971 text.
These recent Egyptian debates speak directly to the themes
raised eloquently by Jack Balkin’s recent book, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World. For Balkin, the American Constitution similarly has its oppressive and emancipatory narratives. But
in his view, citizens committed to building a democratic American
culture should maintain faith in a collective “story about progress
within the constitutional system.” 20 Balkin willingly admits that all

mately did little to rein in the power of the president or the country’s determined security
apparatus.” Brown, supra note 5.
17. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST
WORLD 23 (2011).
18. Id. at 24.
19. Agrama, supra note 10.
20. BALKIN, supra note 17, at 49.
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constitutions—American as well as Egyptian—“are agreements with
hell, at least to somebody.” 21 Yet he believes that the U.S. constitutional project has resources embedded within it that justify an optimistic orientation, an orientation that suggests “that however bad
things are in the present” the prevailing system has the internal capacity “to get better in the future.” 22 Balkin’s advice to those who consider themselves political “progressives” is to embrace this constitutional
promise as the discursive and ideological means for attaining substantive equality and effective freedom. Although the actual and everyday
constitution may be riddled with real injustices, progressives must
hold firm to faith in an idealized document and should see the shared
language of constitutionalism as the privileged instrument for redeeming political life. 23
Over the following pages, I plan to challenge the wisdom of remaining ever-faithful to constitutional continuity, especially for Americans explicitly committed to political change. In effect, my view is
that the American constitutional predicament historically has not
been that distinct from the predicament facing Egyptian activists today. I begin in Part II by sketching a counter-story of American constitutionalism to stand alongside Balkin’s account. Where Balkin sees
the text as embodying an unfulfilled aspiration toward universal
equality and a democratic culture, the structure of the Constitution
also highlights a very different historic narrative: one of colonial rule
not unlike that present in Asia and Africa throughout much of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This framework systematically
separated between free European citizens (who enjoyed the benefits
of full membership) and ethnically defined imperial subjects (who
faced intricate systems of control and supervision). In Asia and Africa, those involved in anti-colonial and independence movements believed that, given such colonial reality, political redemption required
an explicit and formal constitutional rupture from dominant structures of authority.
In Parts III and IV, I will develop this reflection by exploring a
key era in the American past: the Civil War and the initial months of
Reconstruction. My argument is that the American failure to similarly
embrace rupture and to break from constitutional faith played a critical role in sustaining practices of subordination. Through an analysis
of two seminal Supreme Court decisions, the Prize Cases 24 and Ex parte
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 48.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 25.
67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
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Milligan, 25 I argue that the commitment to constitutional continuity
actually undermined—rather than facilitated—the possibility of a truly emancipatory and anti-colonial politics. By way of a conclusion, I
then indicate what legal and political implications we should draw today from both global anti-colonial efforts and our own Reconstruction
past. In particular, I argue that such experiences raise profound
questions about the utility at all of a redemptive narrative framework
(whether political or constitutional) and highlight the extent to
which narratives of tragedy are better contemporary tools for confronting injustice. Moreover, these historic moments also underscore
how, depending on the circumstances, constitutionalism may be just
as likely to inhibit transformative change as to foster it. Indeed, despite fears of illiberality and unchecked power, Americans who are
self-avowed progressives should be much more willing to challenge
constitutional faith and, at times, even to advocate popular discretion
and legal rupture.
II. OUR COLONIAL CONSTITUTION AND THE REDEMPTIVE POLITICS OF
ANTI-COLONIALISM
Balkin’s call for progressives to remain faithful to the Constitution is bound to a particular vision of social criticism. He implicitly
embraces what Michael Walzer has called “connected criticism,” or an
orientation in which critics see their own views as part of an internal
argument within the practices of a given society. The critics seek to
reshape a community’s institutions by reference to shared traditions,
histories, and values. 26 For Balkin, the Constitution is the premier
American site for such immanent critique. It is the imaginative tradition in the United States with the deepest communal resources for
pursuing emancipatory ends. As he declares, “the text provides a
common framework for constitutional construction that offers the
possibility of constitutional redemption.” 27 In this Part, however, I will
highlight potential drawbacks of immanent critique in the American
context, especially when it privileges constitutional traditions above
all else.
As even Walzer notes, connected criticism is not without its limitations. 28 He reminds us that this mode of critique ultimately “ap-

25. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
26. MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 39 (1993).
27. BALKIN, supra note 17, at 232.
28. See WALZER, supra note 26, at 38–40 (discussing connected critics and “two legitimate worries about the connected critic”).
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peal[s] . . . to local or localized principles.” 29 The power of the critic’s
arguments rests on her ability to “connect them to the local culture.” 30 By linking the critic’s arguments to the pervasive culture, the
critic gains the ability to make members of a society recognize seemingly radical possibilities and aspirations as their own. 31
Yet, at the same time, she is nonetheless constrained by the discursive framings that strike social members as consistent with their actual self-understanding. Since traditions—even quite flexible ones—
are not absolutely open, projects of connected criticism must accommodate local presumptions about a community’s basic character. 32
But what if a society is riddled with forms of subordination that its
privileged members simply do not perceive (or do not recognize as
key political and legal features)? In this circumstance, the accommodationist posture of connected criticism can have the tendency to occlude, or even to erase, modes of hierarchy that—although real—fail
33
to resonate with local self-perception.
Indeed, one can argue that this erasure has been a classic problem in dominant narratives of American constitutionalism. These
narratives often begin from a presumption that the American Revolution should be conceived of as an anti-imperial break, which rejected
not only monarchical power but an entire “system of social hierarchy.” 34 In Balkin’s telling, this anti-imperial and egalitarian project
was the animating purpose behind the 1776 Declaration of Independence, whose governing proposition was the belief “that all men
are created equal” 35 and thus equally worthy of freedom. 36 Under this

29. Id. at 39.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 44–45 (“[A]fter the new ideas have been naturalized in their new setting . . . native critics . . . can put them to use.”). In fact, this radical discursive potential is
why, depending on the circumstances and the specific tradition being valorized, I too have
been willing to embrace connected criticism as a rhetorical strategy for making normative
arguments. See AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 17–19, 18 (2010) (defending connected criticism as a powerful tool for highlighting the diversity of American
political thought as well as “how apparently marginal views of freedom and social membership are themselves foundational aspects of our identity”).
32. WALZER, supra note 26, at 52.
33. For related concerns with erasure in national identity, see Norman W. Spaulding,
Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 1993 (2003) (arguing for “countermemory” as a tool in
American constitutional practice to address issues of “forgetting,” particularly in the context of race and Reconstruction).
34. See BALKIN, supra note 17, at 20–21.
35. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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account of political origin, the Constitution and its discursive framings enjoy an elevated standing because, as Balkin writes, the Constitution provided “legal and political” mechanisms through which the
Declaration’s promise of equal liberty could “be redeemed in history.” 37
But for an entire twentieth-century black political tradition, from
W.E.B. Du Bois to Paul Robeson to Malcolm X, such a focus on the
American Revolution’s anti-imperial dimension undermined the ability of most Americans to appreciate the extent to which the constitution-in-practice was a continuation of European projects of empire. 38
Indeed, the governing origin story obscured the real persistence of a
colonial system in North America, organized around a fundamental
racial dichotomy between settlers and nonsettlers. 39 As Du Bois remarked to an audience in Haiti in 1944, colonial circumstances were
not only those in which one “country belong[ed] to another coun40
They also included “groups, like the Negros of the United
try.”
States, who do not form a separate nation and yet who resemble in
41
their economic and political condition a distinctly colonial status.”
This status—familiar to indigenous societies in Asia and Africa—
assumed a constitutional politics built on two distinct accounts of sovereign power: one of democratic consent and internal checks, and
another of external and coercive discretion. In the United States,
such a dual sovereign framework served to separate free settler insiders from a patchwork of ethnically excluded groups, who found themselves subject to a complicated structure of overlapping hierarchies.
These hierarchies provided each colonized community distinct modes
of governance and levels of rights, depending on internal economic
needs and the dictates of political order. For instance, free blacks and
nonwhite Mexicans were formally granted citizenship but were over36. See BALKIN, supra note 17, at 18 (“Our country sprang forth from a revolution in
political and social structure. The Declaration explains the point of that revolution, and
hence the point of our constitutional enterprise.”).
37. Id. at 19.
38. See RANA, supra note 31, at 329–36 (“Du Bois understood the black experience in
the United States as a particular variant of Europe’s larger colonial legacy and thus believed that any meaningful commitment to eliminating the vestiges of colonialism meant
supporting its elimination everywhere.”).
39. See id. at 114–20 (discussing how the colonial rubric “presented nonsettler populations as conquered and imperial subjects, appropriately ruled through pre-political and
immutable forms of authority”).
40. W.E.B. Du Bois, The Colonial Groups in the Postwar World, in AGAINST RACISM:
UNPUBLISHED ESSAYS, PAPERS, ADDRESSES, 1887–1961, at 229, 229 (Herbert Aptheker ed.,
1985).
41. Id.
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whelmingly denied the basic economic and political conditions (like
voting rights and easy land access) essential for republican liberty.
For Native Americans, the reservation system mimicked structures of
indirect rule emerging in parts of Asia and Africa. As with some overseas European colonies, federal courts and administrators sought on
the one hand to limit federal responsibility for Indian welfare while
on the other hand ensuring that settlers possessed an overriding authority to claim indigenous land or to reconstruct tribal institutions if
necessary. And with respect to slaves, settler requirements entailed the
wholesale rejection of any meaningful rights. 42
For Du Bois and others, while the reality of American life was one
of settler colonization, the anti-imperial narrative of the American
Revolution meant that those ethnically included did not see themselves as colonizers. In fact, most Americans viewed the very purpose
of “founding” as a repudiation of European imperial hegemony. If
anything, the dominant discursive narratives made it nearly impossible for social insiders to recognize their own constitutional order as
part of a global history, one that (regardless of British imperial rupture) remained legally akin to European settler societies in South Africa, Algeria, and elsewhere.
In effect, American constitutional identity helped to hide from
popular self-perception the basic nature of the political community.
A significant consequence was that insiders, who enjoyed the privileges of racial hierarchy, never perceived how domestic histories of
unequal membership were only one piece of the international “problem of the . . . color-line,—the relation of the darker to the lighter
races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the
sea.” 43 Moreover, this perceptual blindness persisted despite the fact
that the Declaration’s very text spoke to the United States’s colonial
underpinnings, as it castigated the King for “excit[ing] domestic insurrections amongst us, and . . . endeavor[ing] to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages.” 44
In Du Bois’s view, the failure of U.S. constitutionalism to see the
nation in colonial terms meant that it fundamentally truncated the
dilemma of race in America. Although dominant legal narratives in
the twentieth century accepted the sinfulness of slavery, they essentially viewed the United States as an incomplete liberal society. As
Balkin might argue, the United States was founded in an “ideal of so42. Id. at 119–20.
43. W.E.B. DU BOIS, Of the Dawn of Freedom, in THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK: ESSAYS AND
SKETCHES 23, 23 (Fawcett Pub. 1961) (1953).
44. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 29 (U.S. 1776).
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cial equality,” but “previous generations . . . had realized [this idea]
only partially.” 45
According to Du Bois, the result was a vision of black equality—
prevalent in mainstream politics—that focused primarily on ending
formal discrimination and on providing worthy elements within the
black community with an equal opportunity to achieve professional
and middle-class respectability. This vision emphasized social mobility
for black elites and inclusion for some into arenas of corporate and
political power, but it left prevailing socio-economic hierarchies
largely intact. 46 As noted biographer Manning Marable writes of Du
Bois’s view, the mainstream civil-rights approach failed fundamentally
to connect racial and class dynamics and thus inadequately perceived
how “the Color Problem and the Labor Problem [were] to so great an
extent two sides of the same human tangle.” 47
For Du Bois, by ignoring the deep colonial infrastructure of
American life, such an approach not only transformed civil rights into
a solely domestic project disconnected from global anticolonial efforts, it also downplayed the systematic forms of economic and political subordination that marked the pervasive experience of most
blacks (as well as most nonwhites generally). In Martin Luther King,
Jr.’s words, such subordination produced the nonwhite reality of
“poverty amid plenty,” in which the condition for those excluded was
one of “educational castration and economic exploitation.” 48 Therefore, overcoming racism required more than elite black advancement,
it entailed “a radical restructuring of the architecture of American society.” 49 As Du Bois told a college audience in North Carolina shortly
before leaving for exile in newly independent Ghana, although the
United States was “definitely approaching . . . a time when the American Negro will become in law equal in citizenship to other Americans,” this represented only “a beginning of even more difficult problems of race and culture.” 50

45. BALKIN, supra note 17, at 23.
46. See, e.g., W.E.B. Du Bois, Whither Now and Why, in THE EDUCATION OF BLACK
PEOPLE: TEN CRITIQUES 1906–1960, at 149, 149–58 (Herbert Aptheker ed., 1973) (warning
civil rights leaders in 1960 about the limitations of liberal integration, particularly as a solution to the persistent economic marginalization experienced by the bulk of the black
community).
47. MANNING MARABLE, W.E.B. DU BOIS: BLACK RADICAL DEMOCRAT 107 (1986).
48. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: CHAOS OR COMMUNITY?
112 (1967).
49. Id. at 133.
50. W.E.B. Du Bois, supra note 46, at 149.
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The driving logic of Du Bois’s position was that, given its colonial
foundations, the constitutional tradition was a limited site to locate a
racially redemptive politics in America. If anything, constitutionalism
and its story of origin obscured the essential characteristics of the
American republic. 51 Du Bois was hardly alone in questioning the
value of constitutional continuity or criticizing the “metaphysical . . .
52
fetich-worship [sic]” of the text that dominated so much of U.S. constitutional discourse. In many ways, his thoughts mirrored arguments
developed at the time by anti-colonial intellectuals abroad, who asserted that the best way to challenge colonialism was to engage in an
explicit institutional and imaginative break: to embrace legal rupture
as the precondition for true liberation.
Perhaps no figure articulated these views more systematically
than C.L.R. James, the seminal West Indian social critic and historian.
In The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution, James sought to use a reinterpretation of the 1791–1804 Haitian
slave revolt to present his own redemptive narrative of anticolonial
emancipation. 53 For James, unlike the American settler revolt against
the British, the Haitian uprising was a truly anti-imperial revolution
premised on eliminating root and branch the colonial dynamics of
extractive plantation-labor and racial bondage in the Indies. 54 Moreover, James, writing on the eve of decolonization in Asia and Africa,
saw the Haitian Revolution as providing a political template for independence struggles in the mid-twentieth century. In James’s own
words, “those black Haitian labourers and the Mulattoes have given us
an example to study.” 55 This template rejected decolonization efforts
that sustained the existing legal infrastructure of the colonial state.
Instead, it called for the creation of new constitutional orders that repudiated any identitarian link with the colonial past and explicitly
embraced comprehensive social transformation.
In recent years, the closest exemplar of James’s vision of redemption through constitutional rupture has been the adoption of an explicitly post-apartheid South African constitutional text. The text’s
preamble highlights the fundamental nature of the legal break with

51. See supra text accompanying notes 38–42.
52. W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 1860-1880, at 336 (1998)
(1935) [hereinafter DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION].
53. C.L.R. JAMES, THE BLACK JACOBINS: TOUSSAINT L’OUVERTURE AND THE SAN
DOMINGO REVOLUTION, at ix–xi (2d. ed. 1963) (1938).
54. See, e.g., id. at 375 (“Those who knew San Domingo, however, knew that there
would never be any more slavery for the blacks there . . . .”).
55. Id. at 375.
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the previous order and underscores its central mission as broadranging socioeconomic change. It begins, “We, the people of South
Africa, Recognise the injustices of our past; Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land; Respect those who have
worked to build and develop our country; and Believe that South
Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity.” 56 It then
continues by declaring the purpose of the Constitution to “establish a
society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental
human rights.” 57
The South African experience raises a basic question for Americans committed to constitutional continuity: whether Du Bois and
others may have been correct. Would there have been an earlier and
to date more complete elimination of colonial and racial subordination if a similarly explicit constitutional rupture occurred in the United States? In the following Parts, I will return to the Civil War and
Reconstruction period to argue that faith in our constitutional tradition has historically embodied one important roadblock to a more
thoroughgoing redemptive politics. This argument, and indeed the
invocation of Du Bois and James, is about more than antiquarian curiosity. It suggests that if the commitment to constitutional continuity
has at key moments undermined progressive political principles, we
today should be wary of seeing constitutionalism as the privileged path
to redemption. Indeed, the lesson for progressives might be to
deemphasize constitutional faith and to develop more politically instrumental approaches to the value of constitutionalism.
III. THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION AND THE PRIZE CASES
In thinking historically about the practical consequences of constitutional continuity, it is worthwhile to assess those points in American life when colonial practices of subordination faced profound internal pressure. Perhaps the greatest such moment in the early
republic occurred during the Civil War and concerned Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, which on January 1, 1863, unilaterally freed all slaves in secessionist territory still in rebellion. As
Sandy Levinson reminds us, “the Proclamation is a most peculiar
document,” leaving the institution untouched in Union slave states
and “parts of the ostensibly secessionist states that had been brought

56. S. AFR. CONST. pmbl., 1996.
57. Id.
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under Union control.” 58 Despite its limitations, the Proclamation
nonetheless spoke to the collapsing nature of the institution of slavery. Moreover, the Proclamation occurred alongside growing efforts
to recruit black soldiers, including newly freed slaves in the South. If
the 1776 Declaration of Independence listed as one of its grievances
the decision by Virginia Governor Dunmore to emancipate slaves willing to join British forces, 59 then Lincoln now was engaged in precisely
the same practice—one long perceived as a threat to the safety and
internal identity of the republic. Taken together, the freeing and
arming of the black population directly challenged the settler basis of
American society. These wartime practices also implicitly raised questions concerning the future status of freed blacks, namely the extent
to which individuals who fought on the Union side would be incorporated as social members regardless of race. 60
Among the most compelling features of the decision to pursue
emancipation was the issue of its constitutionality. As Levinson has
discussed, the legality of the Proclamation was deeply questioned at
the time, with none other than Benjamin Curtis—the former Supreme Court Justice who dissented in Dred Scott—issuing a pamphlet
condemning it as an overreach of executive power. 61 According to
Curtis, whose stand against Roger Taney garnered him the esteem of
many in Republican circles, the Proclamation not only failed to adequately distinguish loyal from disloyal citizens in the seceding states,
but also entailed a theory of presidential war power so capacious as to
suggest no meaningful limits: “If the President . . . may by an executive decree, exercise this power to abolish slavery in the States, because he is of the opinion that he may thus ‘best subdue the enemy,’
58. See Sanford Levinson, The David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Was the Emancipation Proclamation Constitutional? Do We/Should We Care What the Answer Is?, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1135,
1139. In the Union, the Proclamation did not affect slaveholding in Maryland, Delaware,
Kentucky, and Missouri. As for secessionist territory now occupied by the federal government, it also exempted recaptured cities such as New Orleans in Louisiana as well as Norfolk and Portsmouth in Virginia. Id.
59. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776) (“He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our
frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished
destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.”).
60. In fact, thirty years later, Justice Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson argued that given the
centrality of military service to social membership it was a profound injustice that blacks,
who “risked their lives for the preservation of the Union,” would be barred from riding in
coach cars in segregated southern communities with whites. 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
61. See Levinson, supra note 58, at 1144–45 (“It has never been doubted that the power
to abolish slavery within the States was not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, but was reserved to the States.” (citation omitted)).
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what other power . . . may not be exercised by the President.” 62 In
fact, for Curtis, since Lincoln himself rejected the idea that the rebellion was legal, the domestic laws of those states remained valid and its
citizens still enjoyed their constitutional rights. These laws and rights
could not be made “null and void” merely through presidential fiat. 63
Given the constitutional uncertainty, Lincoln very well could
have responded to these critics by embracing the extra-legality of his
decision, which he explicitly did on occasion during the Civil War.64
Certainly, in Levinson’s view, the legitimacy of the Proclamation today
ultimately rests not on constitutional fidelity but on its substantive justice—the manner in which the Proclamation signalled an institutional
rupture from existing modes of racial bondage. 65 In fact, in the midnineteenth century, there existed a longstanding political tradition of
what John Locke had called “prerogative power,” in which the executive in extraordinary times contravened the law in the name of necessity or justice and then accepted the political consequences of such
illegality. 66 Locke saw the use of prerogative as a decidedly political
rather than a constitutional act; its legitimacy came from a public
judgment after the fact that such pure discretion was warranted. In
discussing the Louisiana Purchase, Thomas Jefferson similarly invoked this vision of extra-legal and discretionary political action, one
that could only be authorized by post-fact popular acceptance. In his
words, “The Executive . . . [has] done an act beyond the Constitution.
The Legislature in . . . risking themselves like faithful servants,
must . . . throw themselves on their country for doing for them unau62. PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 281 (5th ed.
2006) (quoting Curtis).
63. Id. at 280.
64. For instance, Lincoln admitted in his July 4, 1861, address to Congress that his unilateral enlargement of the army and the navy were likely unconstitutional, even though in
his view absolutely necessary: “These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured
upon, under what appeared to be a popular demand, and a public necessity; trusting, then
as now, that Congress would readily ratify them.” He continued by underscoring the legitimacy of extra-legal action in moments of crisis, by famously demanding, “are all the laws,
but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?” Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), available
at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=1063.
65. See Levinson, supra note 58, at 1150–52 (“If we applaud Lincoln, it is . . . because we
applaud his values and his political vision, not because we venerate him for any particular
devotion to the idea of fidelity to law as a primary norm.”).
66. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION, § 160 (J.W. Gough ed., 1946) (“This power to act according to
discretion for the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even
against it, is that which is called prerogative.”). For more on the idea of prerogative and its
approach to liberal legality, see generally Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385 (1989).

2012]

FREEDOM STRUGGLES

1029

thorized what we know [the people] would have done for themselves
had they been in a situation to do it.” 67
Lincoln, however, made a conscious choice to avoid justifying the
Proclamation as a discretionary act of extra-legal justice, whose legitimacy was not bound to constitutionalism per se. He sought instead to
read the Proclamation as consistent with a project of constitutional
continuity. This meant arguing that the President’s commander-inchief authority (as well as powers implied by the executive oath) sanctioned emancipation as an expedient of military emergency. 68 In a
letter to Albert Hodges, a Kentucky journalist who opposed both the
Proclamation and the arming of freed blacks, Lincoln emphasized
that he was not motivated by antislavery ideology and acted in accordance with constitutional fidelity:
I aver that, to this day, I have done no official act in mere
deference to my abstract judgment and feeling on slavery. I
did understand however, that my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of my ability, imposed upon me the duty
of preserving, by every indispensable means, that government—that nation—of which that Constitution was the organic law. 69
In response to other potential skeptics, Lincoln reiterated how
both emancipation and the arming of freed slaves were matters of
military judgment, constitutionally justified by the executive’s commander-in-chief powers. In a letter to be read on his behalf at a public rally in Lincoln’s hometown of Springfield, Illinois, he wrote of
these policies:
I know . . . that some of the commanders of our armies in
the field who have given us our most important successes,
believe the emancipation policy and the use of the colored
troops constitute the heaviest blow yet dealt to the Rebellion, and that at least one of these important successes could
not have been achieved when it was, but for the aid of black
soldiers. Among the commanders holding these views are
some who have never had any affinity with what is called Ab-

67. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Breckinridge (Aug. 12, 1803), available at
http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=1915.
68. See Levinson, supra note 58, at 1142 (discussing Lincoln’s constitutional justifications for the Emancipation Proclamation).
69. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Albert G. Hodges (April 4, 1864), in LINCOLN:
ADDRESSES AND LETTERS 204, 205 (Charles W. Moore ed., 1914).
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olitionism or with the Republican party politics but who held
them purely as military opinions. 70
In many ways, Lincoln’s arguments on behalf of the constitutionality of the Proclamation were among the best that could be marshaled from within the constitutional tradition. In Balkin’s language,
they spoke to an effort (however halting) to make a redemptive political enterprise consistent with faith in the Constitution, especially
faith in its discursive capacity to serve as a language for emancipation. 71 Yet, with the benefit of hindsight, one might well argue that
the decision to tie the Proclamation to a commitment to constitutional continuity came at its own real cost. First, by focusing on military
necessity, it deemphasized the radical significance of Lincoln’s policies and the extent to which the Proclamation—as well as the arming
of freed blacks—embodied a fundamental transformation from
preexisting structures. 72 And second, by framing the legitimacy of
emancipation in terms of presidential emergency power, the practical
legal precedent of Lincoln’s approach was to embed within the constitutional system justifications for unchecked executive authority. 73
74
Both consequences are exemplified by the Prize Cases, the Supreme Court decision that—while not directly addressing the Proclamation—profoundly impacted its perceived constitutionality for the
remainder of the conflict. 75 In the Prize Cases, the Court assessed the
legality of Lincoln’s decision, in the days following the attack on Fort
Sumter, to pursue a naval blockade of the South even though Congress remained in recess. As a textual matter, Lincoln’s unilateral action appeared to violate the express language of the Constitution,
which gave to Congress alone the power both to “declare war” and to
“make rules concerning captures on land and water” during wartime. 76 Yet, not only did a sharply divided five-to-four Court uphold
70. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to James C. Conkling (Aug. 26, 1863), in LINCOLN,
supra note 69, at 195, 198.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 17–18 (discussing Balkin’s views on the U.S.
Constitution).
72. See supra text accompanying note 70.
73. See generally Levinson, supra note 58 (discussing the constitutional ramifications of
the Emancipation Proclamation).
74. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
75. In the words of seminal political scientist Clinton Rossiter, “the Prize Cases went far
to discourage determined assaults on the validity of the . . . Emancipation Proclamation . . . . The decision . . . was a welcome addition to the arguments of the Union men,
and Lincoln fought his war with no more thought about the Supreme Court than was necessary in making his five appointments.” CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 75 (Richard P. Longaker ed., 1976) (footnote omitted).
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
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the blockade, it went further and presented a sweeping theory of presidential authority. 77
According to Justice Robert Grier’s majority opinion, the executive enjoyed a unilateral emergency power “to resist force by force.” 78
This meant that even if Congress had not provided legislative sanction
to presidential action, in times of invasion or attack inherent authority existed within the presidency “to meet the [emergency] in the
shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it
with a name.” 79 Furthermore, whether to use force in the face of
“armed hostile resistance” and how much force to employ were executive judgments solely. Such questions were questions “to be decided by him [the President], and this Court must be governed by the
decisions and acts of the political department of the Government to
which this power was entrusted. ‘He must determine what degree of
force the crisis demands.’” 80
What also made the Prize Cases significant for Lincoln’s broader
wartime policies was a connected argument about the very nature of
the Civil War. Justice Grier asserted that while Congress “alone has
the power to declare a national or foreign war,” no clause in the Constitution gave it the authority to “declare war against a State, or any
number of States.” 81 This was critical because ordinarily the President’s war powers (such as under the commander-in-chief clause)
were only triggered once Congress had sanctioned the use of force,
legally initiating the start of armed hostilities. But in this context, following the attack on Fort Sumter, the Union clearly found itself facing a massive insurrection and thus a de facto state of war. Moreover,
Congress did not have the constitutional authority to declare war
against rebelling states and thereby give the conflict its de jure legislative approval. Justice Grier concluded that although this Civil War
could not be “declared” through traditional means, as a matter of
common sense a war still existed and still triggered the full panoply of
the President’s Article II powers:
The Constitution confers on the President the whole Executive power. He is bound to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. He is Commander-in-chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States . . . . He does not initiate the war,

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

67 U.S. (2 Black) at 680.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 669.
Id. at 670.
Id. at 668.
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but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any
special legislative authority. 82
In effect, the President enjoyed independent constitutional authority to employ military action to defeat the rebellion, even if Congress could not declare war in the normal manner. This focus on the
unusual legal status of the Civil War was quite suggestive, especially
for how to view presidential power after Congress finally met in session on July 4, 1861. Although Grier never addressed the issue, his
reasoning raised the possibility that the President may still have had a
legitimate constitutional basis—grounded in defensive emergency
powers—to pursue unilateral action throughout the conflict, given its
insurrectionary and undeclared character.
One should note that these arguments, with their focus on inherent and broad presidential authority, were hardly necessary for
reaching a conclusion that the blockade alone was legal. The Court
had many potential theories at its disposal. For example, the Court
could have conceded that Congress’s power to declare war operated
even in a conflict with seceding states and that the President could
not act in the absence of explicit legislative authorization. 83 Nonetheless, Justice Grier might have contended that the blockade was justified due to the truly unprecedented nature of the particular factual
circumstances. As Congress had been in recess during the attack on
Fort Sumter, it was unable to provide ex ante legislative sanction and
the executive had no choice but to act unilaterally in order to put
down a surprise rebellion. 84 Additionally, the Court could have centered its ruling on the argument that because Congress eventually ratified the blockade, this post hoc ratification legally validated the executive decision. 85
Yet the majority did not appear interested in a narrow holding,
one that while justifying the blockade presented the likelihood of future piece by piece struggles over the legality of Lincoln’s wartime
policies. 86 Three of the five Justices (Samuel Miller, David Davis, and
82. Id.
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (“The Congress shall have Power [t]o . . . declare
War . . . .”).
84. Thomas H. Lee & Michael D. Ramsey, The Story of the Prize Cases: Executive Action
and Judicial Review in Wartime, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 53, 56–57 (Christopher H.
Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
85. Justice Grier raised this latter point in passing, but went out of his way to state that
such ratification after the fact was not “necessary under the circumstances” for the blockade’s constitutionality. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 671.
86. See DAVID M. SILVER, LINCOLN’S SUPREME COURT 105–06 (University of Illinois
Press 1998) (1956) (noting that the decision in the Prize Cases “would reflect upon all acts
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Noah Swayne) were recent Lincoln appointees and Republican Party
stalwarts. 87 And, in effect, the Grier majority produced an opinion
expansive enough to provide discursive cover to the broad range of
Lincoln’s practices, perhaps none more symbolically prominent than
the recent Emancipation Proclamation. 88 Indeed, the status of the
proclamation had hung heavy over the case, with oral arguments occurring only six weeks after Lincoln had issued the emancipation order. Given the fact that both the blockade and emancipation were
unilateral acts that denied southerners their property rights, as legal
scholars Thomas Lee and Michael Ramsay note, “[e]ven a narrow ruling against the President . . . might [have] call[ed] into question the
constitutional basis of emancipation.” 89
As a purely legal matter, a competent lawyer could still distinguish between the facts surrounding the Prize Cases and those of the
Proclamation. The issue posed by the former was whether seizures
taken before Congress sat in special session and asserted its legislative
war power were valid prizes. 90 The problem of how far the President’s
unilateral authority extended, and thus whether Lincoln could on his
own initiative pursue a blockade or emancipate slaves even after Congress passed relevant legislation, was not directly at stake. In fact, in
oral arguments before the Court, U.S. Attorney Richard Henry Dana,
Jr., consciously sought to limit the scope of the government’s position,
maintaining that the only subject concerned “the power of the President before Congress shall have acted, in case of a war actually existing.” 91 Nonetheless, the decision’s language—with its vision of an assertive commander-in-chief, its rejection of Congress’s ability to
declare war on states, and its interpretative space for a broader reading of unilateral executive action throughout the entirety of the Civil
War—made clear to observers the likely fate of any future challenge
to Lincoln’s emancipation. 92 For the New York Times, Justice Grier’s
Lincoln had taken before the assembling of Congress on July 4 and upon Lincoln’s concept of executive powers in wartime”).
87. Id. at 114.
88. See id. at 117 (“The decision gave promise that any future challenge of Lincoln’s
powers would be similarly pushed aside.”).
89. Lee & Ramsey, supra note 84, at 66.
90. SILVER, supra note 86, at 104, 107.
91. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 660 (1862).
92. Lee & Ramsey, supra note 84, at 83. In explaining how the ruling “took the wind
out of the sails of potential challenges,” Lee and Ramsey write: “If the President’s wartime
powers allowed him to confiscate the property of citizens of seceded or soon-to-secede
states—and even of neutrals trading with those states—through a blockade at sea, it
seemed also to encompass the power to declare the forfeiture of enemy property on land.”
Id.
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claim that the President had the right under the laws of war “not only
to coerce the [enemy belligerent] by direct force, but also to cripple
his resources by the seizure or destruction of his property” 93 settled
the question—if not as a legally dispositive matter certainly for all
practical purposes. In its editorial on the ruling, the pro-war Times
declared:
It is very difficult to see why the very broad language of the
Court in respect to the proclamation of the blockade does
not involve the constitutional validity of the proclamation
against slave property. . . . It is our firm conviction that the
Supreme Court would indorse . . . every important act of
the Executive or of Congress thus far in the rebellion. 94
Although the constitutionality of unilateral executive emancipation may have provided a central backdrop for the decision, it is not
surprising that the Court never referenced the Proclamation. Due to
the legal posture of the Prize Cases, as Dana remarked in oral arguments, all that needed to be discussed directly was the legality of presidential actions during the congressional recess. Still, this silence underscores a key dimension of constitutional discourse—its capacity at
times to obscure real political stakes. In a sense, the dominant framing of the Proclamation as a question of constitutional war powers allowed the practical legality of black freedom to be answered, albeit
implicitly, in a case about the seizure of foreign vessels.95 Here, the
language of constitutionalism, rather than making explicit questions
of racial subordination, operated to conceal from view the very politics of race. Indeed, today, this contested backdrop for the ruling is
almost never raised by legal scholars or practitioners when discussing
the decision. If anything, by cloaking the racial implications of the
Prize Cases, constitutional narratives have had the paradoxical (even
perverse) effect of casting slavery’s defenders as model civil libertarians. While Justice Grier’s majority opinion has been employed by
government lawyers in the post-9/11 context to defend a notion of
the Constitution as legitimizing nearly any act of presidential judgment, it is the dissent that appears respectful of constitutional principles and rule of law values. 96
93. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 671.
94. Lee & Ramsey, supra note 84, at 83 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations
in original) (quoting The Copperheads and the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 1863).
95. Id.
96. See Louis Fisher, The Law: John Yoo and the Republic, 41 PRES. STUD. Q. 177, 189
(2011) (describing the persistent invocation by John Yoo and other lawyers in the Bush-era
Office of Legal Counsel of the Prize Cases as precedent for wide-ranging unilateral execu-
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To appreciate this last point, it is useful to explore Justice Samuel
Nelson’s dissent as well as the members of the dissenting faction more
closely. If the majority opinion embraced expansive executive authority, Justice Nelson’s opinion spoke instead about the separation of
powers and the liberty of citizens. 97 For those in the dissent, allowing
the President the unilateral power to initiate a blockade prior to a
congressional declaration of war fundamentally imperiled the rights
of free citizens and inverted the Framers’ original constitutional vision for governing warfare and emergency. The majority’s holding
opened the door to future Presidents invoking claims of crisis or
threat in order to gain wartime authorities and thus subject political
opponents to abuse and infringements of their rights. 98
However prescient the sentiment, one should still note precisely
which Justices signed onto Nelson’s dissent. All four men were Democrats, three of whom (Roger Taney, John Catron, and Nelson) had
been part of the Dred Scott majority 99 and the fourth (Nathan Clifford)
was a proslavery politician who had previously served as James Polk’s
attorney general. Each was also widely believed to be suspicious of
Lincoln’s emancipation, and indeed some worried, as hinted above,
that if Chief Justice Taney could gain a fifth vote against the legality of
the blockade it may well signal judicial defeat in the future for the
Proclamation. As Taney biographer Carl Brent Swisher writes, the
Chief Justice certainly rejected the Proclamation’s constitutionality
tive action, including post-9/11 global detention schemes and military strikes abroad
against suspected terrorists—all regardless of existing congressional authorization).
97. See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 693 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
98. Id. (“This great power over the business and property of the citizen is reserved to
the legislative department by the express words of the Constitution. . . . Congress alone
can determine whether war exists or should be declared; and until they have acted, no citizen of the State can be punished in his person or property, u[n]less he has committed
some offense against a law of Congress passed before the act was committed, which made
it a crime, and defined the punishment.”).
99. Although a Pennsylvania native and generally not considered pro-slavery by abolitionists and the Republican press, Frank Otto Gatell, Robert C. Grier, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 435, 435, 439–40
(Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969), Robert Grier too joined the majority in Dred
Scott. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 399 (1857), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Gatell, supra, at 441. Yet, the onset of the civil war
led Justice Grier to view secessionists in a harsh light, declaring them nothing less than “insane.” Gatell, supra, at 442. Riding in circuit, as early as October 1861, Justice Grier made
clear that he would look dimly on arguments about the constitutional rights of members
of the Confederacy and their supporters, stating that “this court . . . can view those in rebellion . . . in no other light than as traitors to their country and those who assume by their
authority a right to plunder the property of our citizens on the high seas as pirates and
robbers.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1134, 1136
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861 (No. 16,318)).
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and many suspected that if he could muster the votes he would press
“the Supreme Court [to] declare the proclamation unconstitutional
at the first opportunity.” 100
For abolitionists, the stirring arguments about checks and balances by the Taney faction on the Court served the very real purpose
of protecting the property rights and colonial status of thousands of
slaveholders. According to one Washington newspaper, in a column
published a few months after the decision in the Prize Cases, it was absolutely unacceptable for “[t]he proclamation of 1863 . . . to be filtered through the secession heart of a man whose body was in Baltimore and whose soul was in Richmond. . . . God help the negro who
depended on Roger B. Taney for his liberty.” 101 According to such
abolitionists, Nelson’s and Taney’s calls for presidential constraint
during wartime functioned in practice to undermine federal efforts to
challenge the institution of slavery and to alter the racial structure of
American life. They sought to remove from the Union’s toolkit a key
mechanism for ending black servitude—a strong and unitary executive.
The foregoing discussion clearly affirms Levinson’s view that the
moral power of the Proclamation rests on its substantive justice rather
than the arguments for legality suggested by Lincoln or Grier—
particularly given the post-9/11 purposes to which these arguments
have been employed. 102 But beyond this, it also highlights how the
redemptive political meaning of the Proclamation persists not because of—but truly in spite of—its attachment during the Civil War to a
language of constitutional continuity. The discourse of constitutionalism in practice operated to occlude the anti-colonial power of
emancipation and to promote arguments about executive power that
in our own time have justified profoundly coercive measures. 103 None
of this is to suggest that Lincoln or his Republican supporters on the
100. CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 571–72 (Archon Books 1961) (1935).
101. Id. at 572 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
102. Although the exact number of individuals liberated by the Proclamation is difficult
to establish, at least one scholar has placed that number in the neighborhood of 400,000.
See ALLEN C. GUELZO, LINCOLN’S EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION: THE END OF SLAVERY IN
AMERICA 214, 309–10 n.13 (2004). It is true that Congress’s two confiscation acts had already freed the slaves of anyone participating in secession (or giving aid and comfort to
the rebellion) who were able to reach union lines; however, these measures did not include slave owners in confederate territory who remained faithful during the war. See
DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 364–66 (1995). As historian Allen Guelzo writes, before the Proclamation, “[e]scape from bondage was temporary and could disappear the
moment a master showed up with paperwork in his hand, demonstrating loyalty to the
federal government and ownership of a slave.” GUELZO, supra, at 213.
103. See Fisher, supra note 96, at 189.

2012]

FREEDOM STRUGGLES

1037

Court did not firmly believe in the moral rightness of presidentially
directed emancipation or in its compatibility with constitutional values and fidelity. Yet it does underline the real tensions between a selfconsciously redemptive political agenda and the desire to speak in
constitutionally respectful terms. During perhaps the first great
American period of fundamental colonial rupture, the constitutional
tradition did not act to heighten the transformative potential of the
political moment. Its primary effect was to rearticulate questions of
racial bondage as those of presidential power and to re-present the
proponents of slavery as civil libertarian defenders of limited government. And as the next Part explores, at a decisive time of potential refounding—early Reconstruction—the invocation of a shared constitutional tradition did more than merely occlude redemptive possibilities, it actually directly impeded change.
IV. MILLIGAN: REDEMPTION OR CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH?
Today, the Supreme Court’s 1866 decision in Ex parte Milligan 104
is embraced as a powerful vindication by the judicial branch of civil
libertarian values and constitutional constraints on wartime excess.
As famed Court historian Charles Warren once wrote, the case “has
been long recognized as one of the bulwarks of American liberty.” 105
According to current civil libertarians, where the Prize Cases suggested
a Court far too deferential to executive say-so, Milligan indicates the
heroic capacity of the judiciary to serve as a check on the political
branches and as a voice for the protection of individual rights.
The case itself concerned Lambdin Milligan, a prominent Indiana Democratic critic of the war effort. 106 In late 1864, Milligan was
arrested by military officials and brought before a military tribunal in
Indianapolis where he was tried on charges of planning to lead an
armed uprising in Indiana to seize weapons, liberate Confederate soldiers, and kidnap the state’s governor. 107 The tribunal found him
guilty and sentenced Milligan to hang. 108 But on appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court unanimously ruled in favor of Milligan, declaring that the military tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to prosecute him. 109

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 6 (1866).
3 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 149 (1922).
Milligan, 71 U.S. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 106–07.
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The Justices, however, differed internally and dramatically over
the actual rationale for the ruling. Both the five-person majority opinion, authored by Justice David Davis, and the four-person concurrence, written by Chief Justice Salmon Chase, agreed that Milligan’s
military tribunal had exceeded the bounds of what Congress authorized. 110 As Justice Davis maintained, Congress indeed passed a statute in March 1863 partially suspending habeas corpus. This partial
suspension allowed the President to arrest a “suspected person” and
to detain that person militarily for “a certain fixed period.” 111 This
period, however, lasted only until an actual grand jury indicted the
individual on criminal charges in civil court or terminated its session
without an indictment. At that point, the President enjoyed no further statutory authorization to hold the detainee in military custody,
let alone to try him or her by a military tribunal. 112
For Chief Justice Chase, in concurrence, the lack of authorization in this case did not mean that Congress had no power to provide
for the military trial of American civilians. 113 Congress, depending on
the circumstances, could well issue a more comprehensive suspension
of the writ. As he declared, “it is within the power of Congress to determine in what states or districts such great and imminent public
danger exists as justifies the authorization of military tribunals for the
trial of crimes and offenses against the discipline or security of the
army or against the public safety.” 114 At its root, as Samuel Issacharoff
and Richard Pildes have highlighted, the constitutional problem for
Chief Justice Chase was the fact that the executive was operating unilaterally, rather than on the basis of clear congressional support. 115
Yet Justice Davis’s majority opinion fundamentally rejected this
focus in the concurrence on inter-branch cooperation. The majority
went much further, arguing that even Congress was constrained in its
ability to curtail the due process rights of civilians. 116 According to
the decision, regardless of congressional authorization, it was unconstitutional for civilians to be tried by a military court unless the locale
was a “theatre of active military operations” and the civil courts were

110. Id. at 108.
111. Id. at 114–15.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 140–41 (Chase, C.J., concurring).
114. Id. at 140.
115. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 1, 9–14 (2004).
116. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127 (majority opinion).
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“actually closed.” 117 For Justice Davis, efforts to depart from the due
process guarantees of the Constitution transformed a republic of limited government into nothing less than military despotism: “Martial
rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in the proper and
unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction.” 118 In sweeping civil libertarian language that is often quoted to this day, Justice Davis concluded that “[t]he Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers
and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of
its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.” 119
Issacharoff and Pildes correctly read the disagreement between
Justice Davis and Chief Justice Chase as one concerning whether the
Court should emphasize a rights-based or “institutional-process
oriented view” of the Constitution during an emergency. 120 But they
never fully locate this debate in Reconstruction politics 121 and so miss
the heat that made the disagreement (and especially Justice Davis’s
internal victory on the Court) so critical. Just as the colonial backdrop to the Prize Cases is today largely unacknowledged, so too have
we lost sight of Milligan’s significance for the very real post-Civil War
possibility of comprehensive anti-colonial rupture. 122 Even more directly than with the Prize Cases, the Milligan decision embodies a moment in which the language of a shared constitutional tradition and
the commitment to legal continuity were employed to stymie a redemptive agenda.
In order to appreciate this point, it is necessary to see the decision through the eyes of the most intensely egalitarian among the
Radical Republicans, Pennsylvania Congressman Thaddeus Stevens.
For Stevens, the end of the Civil War was only the beginning of what
he hoped would be a comprehensive social transformation, one that
re-founded the republic on principles that uprooted wholesale all the
settler exclusivities of American life. 123 In his view, such a redemptive
aspiration entailed more than simply the abolition of slavery, it also
required a long-term project of federal supervision to eliminate those
existing modes of socio-economic subordination that sustained racial
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 120–21.
120. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 115, at 13.
121. One legal scholar who does so is Gil Gott in his article, The Devil We Know: Racial
Subordination and National Security Law, 50 VILL. L. REV. 1073, 1085 n.34 (2005).
122. See supra Part II.
123. HANS L. TREFOUSSE, THADDEUS STEVENS: NINETEENTH CENTURY EGALITARIAN 172,
245 (1997) (discussing Stevens’s views on reshaping southern society after the Civil War).
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domination in the South (and indeed across the country). 124 Stevens
envisioned a new collective order that extended beyond providing
formal legal protections and voting rights to former slaves. 125 His
plan went so far as to redistribute slave plantation land among freed
blacks and poor whites, providing historically marginalized communities with the economic independence and material power to enjoy
meaningful self-rule. 126 According to Du Bois, writing decades later in
Black Reconstruction in America, figures like Stevens and Senator
Charles Sumner of Massachusetts understood that creating a truly
democratic system required “land and education for black and white
127
Stevens himself remarked of newly freed slaves in Decemlabor.”
ber 1865, “This Congress is bound to provide for them until they can
take care of themselves. If we do not furnish them with homesteads,
and hedge them around with protective laws; if we leave them to the
legislation of their late masters, we had better have left them in bondage.” 128
For Stevens, the commitment to universal equality and the goal
of complete anti-colonial rupture were not simply desirable, they were
matters of essential justice dictated by God. 129 Indeed, Stevens took
these beliefs so seriously that he chose to be buried in a black cemetery in Lancaster as a statement of principle given the segregated character of all the white cemeteries. 130 For him, Reconstruction offered
a revolutionary opportunity in which, through concerted political action, the sins of American life could be extirpated and the country
redeemed. 131 Moreover, such redemption entailed not only a total
124. Id. at 166 (discussing Stevens’s efforts to push expanding voting rights and congressional supervision over Reconstruction).
125. Id. at 168.
126. Id.
127. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 52, at 336.
128. See Thaddeus Stevens, “Reconstruction,” December 18, 1865, in Congress, in 2 THE
SELECTED PAPERS OF THADDEUS STEVENS 52 (Beverly Wilson Palmer & Holly Byers Ochoa
eds., 1998).
129. See TREFOUSSE, supra note 123, at 81 (noting Stevens’s view that “God had made of
one blood all the nations of man”).
130. Id. at xi. He wrote as his tombstone inscription:
I repose in this quiet and secluded spot / Not from any natural preference for
solitude / But, finding other Cemeteries limited as to Race / by Charter Rules, /
I have chosen this that I might illustrate / in my death / The Principles which I
advocated / Through a long life / EQUALITY OF MAN BEFORE HIS CREATOR.
Id.
131. See Thaddeus Stevens, Speech on the Fourteenth Amendment, May 8, 1866, in Congress,
in 2 THE SELECTED PAPERS OF THADDEUS STEVENS, supra note 128, at 132 (discussing the
need to “clear away the rotten and defective portions of the old foundations” of the country).
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anti-colonial break, but a break from both the existing legal framework and, if need be, the very values of constitutionalism. In Stevens’s
view, in moments of tension, faith in the American constitutional tradition had to give way to a deeper political one. Stevens expressed
this sentiment by calling for the long-term application of martial law
in the South and by defending the employment of the federal military
even in non-secessionist land. According to him, Reconstruction,
precisely as an epochal moment of re-founding on egalitarian economic and political grounds, required the congressional use of discretionary power—enforced coercively by the strong arm of the military—in the service of political justice. 132 Once more capturing the
essence of Stevens’s approach, Du Bois wrote of this need to privilege
racial transformation over constitutional continuity: “Rule-following,
legal precedence and political consistency are not more important
than right, justice and plain commonsense. Through the cobwebs of
such political subtlety, Stevens crashed and said that military rule
must continue in the South until order was restored, democracy es133
tablished, and the political power built on slavery smashed.”
In many ways, Milligan highlighted the fractured nature of the
Republican Party, which as early as 1866 was increasingly hesitant to
pursue fundamental social change as comprehensively as Stevens desired. 134 Justice Davis and Chief Justice Chase were both close allies of
Lincoln (the former his 1860 presidential campaign manager, the latter his Treasury Secretary). 135 Justice Davis’s sweeping civil libertarian
language and curtailment of congressional authority were understood
by Radical Republicans as a direct assault, by a member of their own
party no less, on the federal government’s capacity to pursue racially
emancipatory ends. 136 Stevens excoriated the Milligan majority, declaring:
That decision, although in terms perhaps not as infamous as
the Dred Scott decision, is yet far more dangerous in its operation upon the lives and liberties of the loyal men of this
country. That decision has taken away every protection in

132. See TREFOUSSE, supra note 123, at 174 (describing Stevens’s policies of seizing “insurgent property” and “treating the former Confederate States as conquered provinces”).
133. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 52, at 336.
134. Id. (noting that the more radical of Stevens’s policies “were not popular with most
Republicans”).
135. See DONALD, supra note 102, at 242, 281.
136. See Thaddeus Stevens, “Reconstruction,” January 3, 1867, in Congress, in 2 THE
SELECTED PAPERS OF THADDEUS STEVENS, supra note 128, at 212 [hereinafter STEVENS, “Reconstruction,” January 3, 1867].
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every one of these rebel States from every loyal man, black
or white, who resides there. 137
Shortly after Stevens’s speech, the Republican magazine Harper’s
Weekly further underscored the perceived connection between Milligan and Taney’s infamous ruling, headlining its piece on Milligan, The
New Dred Scott. 138 Elaborating the parallel, the article declared, “The
Dred Scott decision was meant to deprive slaves taken into a Territory
of the chances of liberty under the United States Constitution. The
Indiana decision operates to deprive the freedmen, in the late rebel
States whose laws grievously outrage them, of the protection of the
freedmen’s Courts . . . .” 139 These “freedmen’s Courts,” referred to in
the article, embodied a separate court system established by the
Freedmen’s Bureau during the early days of Reconstruction to address white crimes against blacks. Such courts were seen by Radical
Republicans as necessary due to the overwhelming prevalence of racial animus in ordinary civil proceedings in the South. 140 The article’s
author worried that since the regular courts were open and functioning, Milligan would operate to undermine the legality of the Bureau’s
courts and to condemn former slaves to the vagaries of a legal system
controlled by their ex-masters.
Indeed, for Stevens and others, the embrace of martial law was
not simply a defense of political discretion over rule-of-law principles
for its own sake. According to Radical Republicans, the problem in
the South was that an entire colonial infrastructure still existed, one
that sustained racial subordination and related economic hierarchies. 141 This infrastructure was epitomized by the traditional legal
system, whose purpose—in Stevens’s mind—was to preserve a framework of white supremacy. 142 Moreover, ex-masters were now innovating new non-slave methods for maintaining a coerced labor supply,
through laws like the Black Codes, and for rehabilitating the structure
of colonial domination shaken by the Civil War. Part of this process
of innovation was the use of extreme violence by white supremacists
as a tool of black intimidation and control—violence that the regular
137. Id.
138. See WARREN, supra note 105, at 154 (citing The New Dred Scott, HARPER’S WEEKLY,
Jan. 19, 1867).
139. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
140. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877,
142 (1988).
141. See TREFOUSSE, supra note 123, at 172.
142. See, e.g., Stevens, “Reconstruction,” January 3, 1867, supra note 136, at 212–13 (discussing the reluctance of the legal system to punish a white man who had brazenly murdered a black man in front of the community).
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courts, for obvious reasons, were uninterested in addressing. In such
circumstances, extra-legal discretion and federal military imposition,
in the name of political justice, were essential for the fulfillment of
equal freedom for all. In effect, political necessity suggested that, at
this moment of historical upheaval, substantive commitments to egalitarian redemption on the one hand, and commitments to a discourse
of constitutionalism on the other, were conflicting ends in which one
could be achieved, but not both simultaneously.
Today’s historians often argue that Justice Davis’s majority opinion in Milligan ultimately had minimal long-term impact on Reconstruction. 143 Congress moved quickly to pass legislation that both
reaffirmed the legality of military tribunals and that curtailed “the
Court’s jurisdiction to hear cases involving military law.” 144 Moreover,
rather than heighten the confrontation with Congress, the Supreme
Court in Ex parte McCardle, an opinion this time authored by Chief
Justice Chase, retreated from Justice Davis’s judicial assertiveness and
validated Congress’s act of jurisdiction stripping. 145 As a result, military tribunals remained commonplace during Reconstruction with
upwards of 1,400 such trials between 1865 and 1870. 146
Still, the immediate consequences of the Milligan decision should
not be ignored. In fact, they were not far off from Radical Republican
fears or, for that matter, the hopes of status quo Democrats. Referring to Stevens and others as possessed by “fanaticism,” the Baltimore
Sun crowed that such individuals were “feeling the sting of death in
the decision.” 147 Employing the Milligan ruling as precedent, President Andrew Johnson declared a complete halt to any trial in either
military or Freedmen’s Bureau courts of civilians. 148 In the process,
Milligan and Johnson’s use of the case ushered in the initial stages of
legal impunity for white violence against blacks in the South, and thus
the reformation of white supremacy under new institutional conditions. November 1866 saw the admitted murder by a white Virginia
doctor of a local African American man for accidentally causing fifty

143. See, e.g., MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES 176 (1991) (arguing that Milligan had little lasting effect on the protection of
civil liberties or the construction of emergency power).
144. LOUIS FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN
REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 59 (2005).
145. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513–14 (1869).
146. FISHER, supra note 144, at 59–60.
147. See WARREN, supra note 105, at 160 (quoting The Baltimore Sun newspaper).
148. HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835–1875, at 326 (1982).
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cents-worth of damage to the doctor’s carriage. 149 After the doctor
was acquitted by the local civil court, the general in charge of the area
used pre-existing congressional authorization for “military jurisdiction
over a variety of cases involving freedmen” 150 to order a military trial.
Although this trial produced a murder conviction, Johnson, again citing Milligan, stepped in to dissolve the commission and to release the
prisoner—taking the local court acquittal as the final word. 151 For
Radical Republicans, in the face of such impunity and the rebirth of
white supremacy in the South, the only response to Milligan was the
swift passage of legislation that reaffirmed military rule and, to the
greatest extent possible, repudiated the Davis opinion. 152
In a sense, the Milligan saga reminds us how the American commitment to constitutional faith actually functioned at a time of real
potential redemption. Justice Davis was not a pro-slavery fire breather. He had been a member of the majority in the Prize Cases, the very
decision that for practical purposes secured the constitutional status
of the Emancipation Proclamation. 153 In fact, Justice Davis, like other
Republicans, sought a meaningful alteration in American society
along tracks more racially egalitarian than that of the antebellum order. 154 What he argued was that any politics of change should maintain faith in the Constitution and in its discursive capacities to fulfill
even radical aspirations. In his view, congressional Republicans had
to reject the drift toward discretionary action and to abide by “principles of the Constitution.” 155 Explaining his opposition to the use of
military tribunals, Justice Davis wrote in Milligan, “Wicked men, ambitious of power, with hatred of liberty and contempt of law, may fill the
place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln; and if this right is
conceded . . . the dangers to human liberty are frightful to contemplate.” 156

149. ERIC L. MCKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 458 (1960).
150. Id. at 458–59.
151. Id.
152. For a broader account of the relationship between race, martial law, and emergency in the legal imagination during Reconstruction, see generally Daniel Kato, The Legal Exceptionality of Racial Violence: Reconstruction, Race, and Emergency (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author); JOHN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: WAR AND HUMANITY IN AMERICA
(forthcoming 2012).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 83–88.
154. See SILVER, supra note 86, at 2 (describing Justice Davis’s hope, expressed during
Lincoln’s presidential campaign, that his victory would bring about a change in the composition of the Court enabling reversal of the Dred Scott decision).
155. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 124–25 (1866).
156. Id. at 125.
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For all the wisdom such words denoted, their political effect, not
unlike Taney’s arguments during the Civil War, was to provide a straitjacket for social transformation. Stevens’s ultimately revolutionary
embrace of discretion did not embody a “hatred of liberty” or a desire
for ambition, but instead articulated a pragmatic calculation that the
best—and perhaps only—means to redemption was through discretionary and, if need be, extra-legal political action. For him, at least
in this context, the commitment to transformation required pursuing
actual constitutional rupture in ways that no doubt challenged the
very legitimacy of the Constitution and its narrative framings. 157 In
the end, one might well ask whether the victory of continuity over an
explicit discourse of political justice and constitutional break helped
discursively to suppress more wide-ranging social change. As Reconstruction receded and political “fanaticism” declined, frameworks of
constitutional construction provided a critical means for suggesting
egalitarian progress while substantively cloaking the reality of persistent and systematic subordination.
In many ways, the Milligan case is a perfect mirror to the Prize
Cases. Today the two majority opinions are a constantly referenced
legal pair: the one providing a precedent for executive unilateralism
and the other an equally powerful precedent for civil libertarian principles. But these decisions are mirror images in more ways than is
commonly appreciated. In Milligan, even more so than the Prize Cases,
an issue ostensibly about white constitutional protection—in which
the implications for freed blacks were never discussed—actually
served to shift meaningfully black social reality and collective possibility. 158 And again like the Prize Cases, the language of constitutionalism
in Milligan has had the long-term effect of erasing the case’s fundamental (and racial) political meaning from the collective memory. 159
If both cases highlight the tensions between political justice and constitutional faith, then in their own way they each also bring home
perhaps an uncomfortable fact for today’s progressives. In some political circumstances, projects of social transformation may well require progressives to choose between principles of effective freedom
and discourses of constitutionalism. In the final pages, I plan to explore what to make of this tension and what conclusions to draw from
the broader account of the Civil War and early Reconstruction.

157. See supra text accompanying notes 123–124.
158. See supra Part IV.
159. See supra Part II.
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V. CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATIC DISCRETION AND NARRATIVES OF
TRAGEDY
The preceding Parts have sought to highlight two claims about
the ties between freedom struggles and constitutional discourses in
America. First, they attempted to remind readers that a long black
political tradition, consciously linked to global independence movements, questioned the very compatibility between redemptive anticolonial aspirations and either constitutional faith or continuity.
Second, such discussions emphasized that at two decisive moments of
potential anti-colonial rupture in the United States, the resort to
frameworks of constitutional construction hindered as much as they
assisted meaningful change. These two claims suggest a lesson and a
caution for contemporary progressives committed to fulfilling goals of
equal and effective freedom. The lesson is that progressives should
be less afraid of political discretion and more instrumental in their
endorsement of constitutional principles and languages. The caution
is that the repeated historic inadequacies of redemptive enterprises—
whether here at home or as part of Third World anti-colonial projects
abroad—raise doubts about the continuing utility of such narratives
of redemption (be they political or constitutional).
Let me begin by developing what I take to be the lesson of the
historical examples. In many ways, Stevens and the most egalitarian
among the Radical Republicans were generating in the first months of
Reconstruction a vision of Congress as an instrument for exercising
what Emmanuel Sieyès famously described as “constituent power.” 160
By this, Sieyès had in mind the sovereign authority that creates and
thus precedes any instituted government. Such power was both democratic and legitimate because it expressed the national will of the
people as a whole. In his view, government and its constituted powers
were justified only to the extent that they remained “faithful to the
laws imposed upon [them]. The national will, on the other hand,
simply needs the reality of its existence to be legal. It is the origin of
all legality.” 161 At a moment of collective re-founding, Stevens sought
to employ congressional discretion and military authority as constituent tools for transforming the basic character of American life—to act
outside the bounds of ordinary legality in order to regenerate legal
norms. 162
160. See Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, What is the Third Estate?, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 93,
136 (Michael Sonenscher ed., 2003).
161. Id. at 137.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 123–124.
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Ultimately, one could argue that the failure of Radical Reconstruction derived from the inability of Stevens and his allies to build a
large enough popular base for these goals. Radical Republicans had
hoped that by extending political and economic power to freed slaves
in the South (their natural allies in the former Confederacy) they
would be able to create an interracial and truly national Republican
majority. But unfortunately, Stevens’s vision of an anti-colonial and
racially egalitarian republic remained a minority perspective in the
North as much as in the South. Stevens’s assertion of constituent
power therefore carried with it for many white Americans (who remained committed to a racially defined republic) the taint of political
vanguardism. Nonetheless, his efforts and those of other Republicans
during Reconstruction offer a powerful contemporary lesson. They
suggest how political discretion—if exercised on behalf of a broad
constituency, one able to provide such practices with widespread
popular legitimacy—has the potential to be both transformative and
democratic.
Today, for many progressives (inside and outside of the legal
community) discretionary authority is almost always associated with
concerns about a usurpatory and “imperial” 163 presidency, while its
democratic potential is hardly ever defended. Not unlike those Egyptian activists who called for fidelity to the existing 1971 Constitution—
regardless of its limitations—the thought is that constitutionalism
protects the rights of the weak and that discretion enhances the power of despots. 164 Given the legal specter of Schmittian dictatorship
and the historical experience of totalitarianism, these fears are not to
be taken lightly. In the words of one such progressive scholar, “the
arbitrary character . . . of constituent power” must be avoided because
it “is where the law ends, and pure politics (or war) begins.” 165 At the
same time, however, the Egyptian example also indicates that the
progressive embrace of constitutional fidelity, as well as related discourses of shared tradition, may have their own pathologies. As the
Mubarak regime exposed, instituted processes can themselves be
deeply oppressive and, by contrast, the popular and extra-legal discre163. The term itself was famously coined by Arthur Schlesinger to describe presidential
leadership during the era of Watergate and Vietnam. Writing of executive authority in
1973, he concluded that: “in our own time it has produced a conception of presidential
power so spacious and peremptory as to imply a radical transformation of the traditional
polity. . . . The constitutional Presidency . . . has become the imperial Presidency and
threatens to be the revolutionary Presidency.” ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, at viii (1973).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 1–12.
165. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 11 (1998).
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tion of mass constituents can serve anti-authoritarian ends. 166 In other words, depending on the political conditions, constituent power
may well be generative and democratic rather than despotic. At the
same time, constitutionalism and frameworks of constitutional construction can simply promote a coercive rule-by-law.
More relevantly for the American case, the story of Thaddeus
Stevens and David Davis indicates that progressive orientations to
constitutional faith should be assessed pragmatically. 167 Not only has
the constitution-in-practice been riddled with injustice, as Balkin powerfully illuminates, but the Constitution’s discursive structures have
not been an unalloyed blessing for the freedom struggles of the
past. 168 Indeed, there is no reason to believe that although the radical
potential of previous movements may have been hindered—at the
most crucial moments—by the focus on constitutional narrative, similar fates will not befall future efforts. If the goal of progressives is a
transformative and ultimately political one, faith should reside in the
ideal of effective and equal freedom alone. This preeminent commitment may require both a politics of constitutional construction as
well as one of constitutional rupture (the latter through democratic
discretion). In a sense, progressive political faith should view its relationship to traditions, including constitutional ones, strategically—to
be asserted when it serves emancipatory purposes and questioned or
even rejected when it does not.
Such a call for progressives to be less tradition-bound and more
willing to embrace constituent power (not to mention its very real political dangers) comes with a final note of caution. Twentieth century
projects of redemption, both revolutionary anti-colonial ones and
those grounded in constitutional faith, have all participated in a particular type of emancipatory history. As theorist David Scott writes,
these redemptive accounts embrace a narrative structure of “romance.” 169 They have presented “narratives of overcoming, often narratives of vindication; they have tended to enact a distinctive rhythm
and pacing, a distinctive direction, and to tell stories of salvation.” 170
Above all, they have posited a future in which individuals can transcend oppression and unshackle freedom from existing modes of
subordination once and for all.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See supra text accompanying notes 13–14.
See supra Part IV.
See supra text accompanying notes 17–23.
DAVID SCOTT, CONSCRIPTS OF MODERNITY: THE TRAGEDY OF COLONIAL
ENLIGHTENMENT 7 (2004).
170. Id. at 7–8.
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Still, the contemporary moment, both in the United States and in
the wider postcolonial world, has been marked by far greater historical complication. Post-apartheid South Africa offers just one telling
illustration. The South African struggle embodied a classic story of
anti-colonial redemption, complete with a revolutionary re-founding
and a fundamental constitutional rupture. 171 Yet, the postcolonial
present in South Africa is much more equivocal than straightforwardly redemptive. Although constitutionally premised on racial equality,
the country remains riddled with extreme economic hierarchies that
are the persistent legacy of apartheid. 172 In fact, the National Party’s
willingness in the early 1990s to relinquish political authority was tied
to key compromises made by the African National Congress, particularly to refrain from expropriating or dramatically curtailing white
economic power in the country. 173 In a sense, the South African redemptive narrative of revolutionary change and salvation—
highlighted by a glowing preamble—belies a more uncertain story of
both rupture and structural continuity, in which even explicit constitutional rejection has hardly assured a future of meaningful racial
equality. Similarly, in the United States, the twentieth century’s great
redemptive social movements—on behalf of organized labor, black
freedom, and women’s equality—have transformed the political terrain but have also either receded in social power or left us with complex presents, marked by the overlap between formal equalities and
substantive injustices. As Scott suggests, the twentieth century romance of redemption and untainted emancipation is now in many ways
“a superseded future, one of our futures past.” 174
The response among progressives should not be to give up generally on a utopian imagination. But it does suggest the value of binding this imagination to historical narratives of tragedy rather than to
those of redemption or romance. By tragedy, I do not mean the notion that “due to some flaw or defect” our political and constitutional
frameworks will necessarily commit us “to a disastrous course of ac171. See Makau wa Mutua, Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits of Rights Discourse, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 63, 65–66 (1997) (describing South Africa’s new constitutional order post-apartheid).
172. Id. at 68.
173. For more on the persistence of the old social order in post-apartheid South Africa,
see GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 123 (2010) (describing the constitution-making process in South Africa as a way to achieve democratic rule while also “assuring the white minority that democratic rule would not simply be an invitation to majoritarian retribution”); Mutua, supra note 171, at 81 (noting “that the [National Party] got
the better of the deal as it was protected against the will of the majority to substantially
transform the state”).
174. SCOTT, supra note 169, at 210.

1050

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1015

tion” that produces “great suffering and severe punishment.” 175 Instead, I mean the idea, certainly embedded in the concept of a tragic
flaw, that historical moments are marked by linked and mutually constitutive relationships of freedom and subordination. In describing
the tragedy in the postcolonial predicament, Scott writes:
[T]ragedy sets before us the image of a man or woman obliged to act in a world in which values are unstable and ambiguous. . . . [F]or tragedy the relation between past,
present, and future is . . . a broken series of paradoxes and
reversals in which human action is ever open to unaccountable contingencies—and luck. 176
Thus, every political period, be it the Civil War, Reconstruction,
or the current-day, presents its own hierarchies and dependencies.
The goal of progressive action is to uncover those forms of dependence and to strive for liberation from them. But even successful
projects of emancipation will produce their own “unaccountable contingencies” and generate new legal and political orders that knit together secured freedoms with emerging hierarchies, as post-apartheid
South Africa and contemporary America suggest. This is the paradox
of tragedy. It offers a narrative in which the struggle for emancipation is a ceaseless one, requiring an aspiration to utopia but never capable of being completely redeemed in history—as total emancipation is always and permanently beyond reach.
Besides speaking to the complexity of our postcolonial and postcivil rights times, such a narrative of tragedy better addresses the current moment in two ways. First, unlike stories of redemption, it provides a greater bulwark against the inclination to rationalize the injustices of the present, especially by acceding to a Whiggish faith in
progress. Redemption stories, as Balkin himself recognizes and critiques, 177 have the tendency to read history as a long-term trend toward
justice, albeit halting and uneven. At a time when old forms of subordination persist in the United States and yet we see sustained backsliding from the very achievements of previous eras, a tragic narrative
frontally challenges the complacent willingness to believe that conditions are “good enough.” It does so by reminding us to be on continuous guard against the hidden and unwitting forms of domination

175. BALKIN, supra note 17, at 81.
176. SCOTT, supra note 169, at 13.
177. As he writes self-critically of constitutional redemption, “The first danger of faith is
the danger of apology or theodicy.” BALKIN, supra note 17, at 83.
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embedded in our social practices, even in those practices—like constitutional construction and veneration—that we collectively esteem.
Second, and finally, an adequately tragic sensibility helps progressives to reclaim a space in their political imagination for democratic discretion. The grave problem of past revolutionary agendas
(anti-colonial or otherwise) was a failure to appreciate fully the destructive violence generated by radical change. But if constitutional
rupture must still be part of the progressive toolkit, an awareness of
the tragic has the potential to cabin the worst consequences of discretion. Tragic discourse, by emphasizing the ambiguous nature of any
transformative project, suggests its own ethic of political responsibility. Such a narrative makes ever-present the potential costs wrought by
legal rupture and compels progressive actors to appreciate the political stakes when breaking from constitutional fidelity. A tragic sensibility demands of progressives both that they aggressively assert emancipatory commitments and that they embrace judicious political
ethics. Ultimately, it imagines an orientation to collective life animated by justice but tempered by the recognition of indissoluble paradox.

